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The last five years have seen a huge increase in the general public's inter-
est in microfinance, which provides financial services such as loans, insur-
ance, and savings instruments to people living in poverty. At the same
time, the popularity of social networking through the Internet has ex-
ploded. These two worlds intersect in the form of websites that permit a
United States individual to use PayPal or a credit card to loan small
amounts of money to poor people around the world. By far the most suc-
cessful of these microcredit websites was also the first such website: Kiva
Microfunds ("Kiva").
Although loans through Kiva are truly loans (that is, the lenders expect
repayment), Kiva loans pay the individual lender no interest. The right to
use money for a period of time has, of course, a real financial value, as the
tax code recognizes in many places. But under current law, even though
Kiva is a tax-exempt organization, lenders through Kiva receive no tax
benefit for the interest they forego when they loan money interest-free
through Kiva. This Article argues that the law should be changed to allow
taxpayers who lend money through a microfinance organization that quali-
fies as a tax-exempt organization and who receive no interest or below-
market interest on those loans the option of taking a charitable deductionfor that foregone interest. The Article also proposes a novel and simple
method for implementing this tax benefit.
The practical benefits of the deduction could be significant. Permitting a
deduction for interest foregone on loans to Kiva and similar microcredit
organizations will help these organizations thrive and thus, as the Nobel
Committee stated about another microcredit institution, play a role as an
"important liberating force" and a "major part" of eliminating poverty as
we know it.
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to Neil
Buchanan, Elizabeth Emens, Miranda Perry Fleischer, Susan R. Jones, Jeffrey Lax, and
participants in the 2008 Critical Tax Theory Conference at Florida State University, espe-
cially Rob E. Atkinson, Jr., for helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts. Kiva
Microfunds had no input into this Article and did not respond to several requests for
comment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ILLIONS of people around the world who live in poverty
would benefit from access to financial services such as loans,
savings, and insurance. Microfinance aims to provide financial
services to these individuals and their small businesses. Microfinance has
existed in one form or another for many years, but the last five years have
seen a huge increase in the general public's interest in providing financial
services to the poor. At the same time, the popularity of social network-
ing through the Internet has exploded. These two worlds intersect in the
form of websites that permit an individual to loan small amounts of
money to poor people around the world. By far the most successful of
these microcredit websites was also the first such website: Kiva
Microfunds ("Kiva").
In the three years since its creation, Kiva1 has been wildly successful.
Hundreds of thousands of people have made loans through Kiva, which
has provided millions of dollars in loans to individuals living in poverty all
1. Kiva Home Page, http://kiva.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2008).
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over the world.2 The organization has been featured in the Financial
Times,3 the Wall Street Journal,4 the New York Times,5 Fortune,6 and Bus-
iness Week, 7 among many other places. Kiva lenders are a dedicated
group, and they see themselves as part of a larger community that in-
cludes not only other Kiva lenders, but also borrowers who receive loans
from Kiva.8 Kiva lenders have created their own websites and message
boards separate from Kiva, and some Kiva lenders have traveled
thousands of miles to visit the individuals to whom they have sent loans. 9
Loans through Kiva are truly loans-that is, the lenders expect repay-
ment-but they lack one feature of loans, at least loans as understood by
the U.S. tax code (the "Code"): Kiva loans pay the individual lender no
interest. It is, of course, valuable to have access to money, even if for a
limited amount of time. In other words, money has a time value. Thus,
the Code generally does not respect the designation of a loan as interest-
free; the time value of money appears in many places throughout the
Code, including in provisions that recharacterize putatively interest-free
loans by imputing interest even where the parties claim that there is
none. 10 But lenders through Kiva receive no charitable benefit for the
interest they forego when they loan money interest-free through Kiva be-
cause, under current law, foregone interest is considered a nondeductible
"partial interest.""
This Article argues that current law should be changed, and taxpayers
who lend money through a microfinance organization that qualifies as a
tax-exempt organization and who receive no interest or below-market in-
terest on those loans should be given the option of taking a charitable
deduction for that foregone interest. Microfinance loans are of sufficient
importance, both in general and to the goals of Kiva and similar organiza-
2. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
3. See Sarah Murray, Charity No Longer a Cottage Industry, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2008, available at http://us.ft.com/flgateway/superpage.it?news-id-ftooll220080851401841
&page=l.
4. See, e.g., Ron Liber, How to Be a Microfinancier: New Sites Use Nobel-Winning
Tactics to Help You Give and Lend, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2006, at B1; Rachel Emma
Silverman, Young Money: A New Generation Reinvents Philanthropy, WALL ST. J., Aug.
21, 2007, at D1.
5. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, You, Too, Can Be a Banker to the Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2007, at A19; Sonia Narang, Web-Based Microfinancing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2006, at 84 (discussing Kiva in its annual "Year in Ideas" issue); Rob Walker, Extra Help-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at MM22.
6. See Jeffrey M. O'Brien, The Only Nonprofit That Matters, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 2008,
at 37.
7. See Jeffrey Gangemi, Making Microfinance Easier, BUs.WEEK, Aug. 16, 2006,
available at http://businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/ang2006/sb20060815_733434.htm?
chan=search.
8. See infra Section II.C (discussing the Kiva community).
9. See, e.g., Bad Dog Pip, http://baddogpip.blogspot.com/2006/12/mifex-neighbor-
hoods-tres-trinitaria.html (Dec. 19, 2006, 17:44 EST) (describing, in a first-person account,
a trip by two Kiva lenders from their home in Arlington, Virginia, to Guayaquil, Ecuador,
to visit the people to whom they had loaned money through Kiva).
10. See discussion infra Section III.C.
11. See discussion infra Section III.B.
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tions, that existing exceptions to the general rule should be expanded to
include foregone interest on such loans. There are some objections to
permitting such a deduction, but on further inspection, almost all these
objections will reveal themselves to be objections to the charitable deduc-
tion in general, and not specifically to a deduction for foregone interest.
After this Introduction, Part II provides a very brief introduction to
microfinance and then describes Kiva in particular. Part III looks more
closely at Kiva's tax treatment, focusing on the tax treatment (that is, the
nondeductibility) of the interest that Kiva's lenders forgo. Part IV pro-
poses that the law should be changed in order to permit deductibility of
that foregone interest and suggests a practical, not particularly compli-
cated way to implement that deduction. Part V examines possible objec-
tions to permitting deductions for foregone interest and concludes that
none of these objections is strong enough to override the argument for
amending the law to permit a charitable deduction for foregone interest.
Part VI concludes.
II. MICROFINANCE AND KIVA
This Part provides a very brief introduction to microfinance and then
explains the structure of one particular microfinance organization, Kiva
Microfunds, and the great success that Kiva has so far enjoyed.
A. WHAT IS MICROFINANCE?
The goal of microfinance is to give poor people access to formal finan-
cial services. 12 Many poor people do not have access to credit or savings
services, and providing these services to the poor can help them earn
more money, improve their lives, and increase their self-confidence.
1 3
Microfinance can also have a wider social impact, increasing the power of
otherwise disadvantaged or excluded groups.' 4 Many microfinance
groups lend primarily to women-for example, as of June 2006, 96% of
the borrowers from Grameen Bank, a prominent microfinance lender,
were women.' 5 Targeting women helps alleviate poverty because "wo-
men are the poorest of the poor," and putting money in the hands of
12. See, e.g., MARGUERITE S. ROBINSON, THE MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION: SUSTAIN-
ABLE FINANCE FOR THE POOR, at xxx (2001) (defining microfinance as "the large-scale
provision of small loans and deposit services to low-income people by secure, conveniently
located, competing commercial financial institutions").
13. See id. at 37-41; see also Martin Greeley, Direct Material Impacts, in 1 MONEY
WITH A MISSION: MICROFINANCE AND POVERTY REDUCTION 46, 65 (James Copestake et
al. eds., 2005) (stating that a group of microfinance providers was "able to demonstrate
that their services are directly improving the material assets of client households," but
noting that there was "insufficient knowledge about the progress" that the microfinance
clients made over time).
14. See, e.g., Naila Kabeer, Wider Impacts: Social Exclusion and Citizenship, in MONEY
WITH A MISSION, supra note 13, at 94, 94-95.




women also helps alleviate gender inequality. 16 Thus, microfinance may
have nonfinancial as well as financial benefits.
Microfinance, in the sense of formal and informal finance opportunities
for the poor, can be traced back hundreds of years, to Irish loan funds in
the 1700s or even before.' 7 Microfinance in its current form, with its em-
phasis on microcredit (that is, small loans to the poor), began in the
1970s, when various nongovernmental institutions began to create com-
mercial microfinance programs.1 8 The most famous of these is perhaps
Grameen Bank, which was founded in 1976 as a research project by
Muhammad Yunus, a university professor who wanted to investigate the
possibility of providing financial services to the rural poor in Ban-
gladesh. 19 Grameen Bank has since become an independent bank. As of
July 2008, it had over $586 million in loans outstanding and claimed to
have a 98% repayment rate.20
Microfinance, and particularly microcredit, have come to the attention
of the general public more recently. The United Nations declared 2005
the "International Year of Microcredit, ' '21 and microfinance became even
more widely known when Yunus and Grameen Bank shared the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2006. As the Nobel Committee wrote:
Micro-credit has proved to be an important liberating force in so-
cieties where women in particular have to struggle against repressive
social and economic conditions. Economic growth and political de-
mocracy can not achieve their full potential unless the female half of
humanity participates on an equal footing with the male. 22
Yunus's long-term vision is to eliminate poverty in the world. That
vision can not be realized by means of micro-credit alone. But
Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank have shown that, in the con-
tinuing efforts to achieve it, micro-credit must play a major part.23
As microfinance became more well-known, websites began to develop
16. See generally Susy Cheston & Lisa Kuhn, Empowering Women Through
Microfinance, in PATHWAYS OUT OF POVERTY 167, 167-228 (Sam Daley-Harris ed., 2002).
17. See BRIGIT HELMS, ACCESS FOR ALL: BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
2-5 (2006) (briefly describing the history of microfinance). The Irish loan funds provided
credit to the poor without requiring collateral. Id. at 3, fig. 1.1. For a general history of the
loan funds, see Aidan Hollis & Arthur Sweetman, Microcredit in Prefamine Ireland, 35
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 347 (1998), and Aidan Hollis & Arthur Sweetman,
Microfinance and Famine: The Irish Loan Funds During the Great Famine, 32 WORLD
DEV. 1509 (2004).
18. See HELMS, supra note 17, at 4-5; see also ROBINSON, supra note 12, at xxxi-xxxii.
19. Grameen Bank, A Short History of Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/
index.php?option=com-context&task=view&id=19&Itemid=114 (last visited Aug. 23,
2008).
20. Grameen Bank, Monthly Report: July 2008, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.
phpoption=comcontent&task=view&id=453&Itemid=527 (last visited Aug. 9, 2008).
There is some debate over the actual repayment rate of Grameen loans. See, e.g., Daniel
Pearl & Michael M. Phillips, Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans for the Poor, Has Hit
a Repayment Snag, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at Al.
21. G.A. Res. 53/197, 1 1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/53/197 (Dec. 15, 1998).





that permitted individuals to participate directly in microfinance. 24 Some
microfinance organizations have started websites that permit individuals
to donate to microfinance lenders. 25 Other websites, however, allow indi-
viduals actually to lend through the website. Some of these websites pay
their lenders interest.2 6 This Article, however, focuses on a microfinance
website that does not offer its lenders interest: Kiva, the first and largest
microfinance website that permits individuals to participate in lending.
The next Section explains Kiva's charitable structure.
B. MICROFINANCE FOR EVERYONE: How KIVA WORKS
Kiva was created in 2005 to permit individuals to participate directly in
microfinance lending.27 Someone who wants to become a microfinance
lender can go to Kiva's website, kiva.org. The website features pictures
of and specific information about people in developing countries who are
requesting loans for specific purposes. For example, the website recently
featured a farmer from Tajikistan who wanted to borrow $1200 to
purchase "mixed fodder":
Juraboy Mahmudov lives in the J. Rasulov region of Tajikistan.
He is married and has four children. He has been an active client of
MicroInvest since 2004. His past loans have enabled him to greatly
improve his business.
He is engaged in the raising and selling of livestock. Mr.
Mahmudov is also the machinist for the collective farm. Mr.
Mahmudov is requesting a loan of $1200 to purchase mixed fodder
for his large flock.28
The website also shows how much money has been loaned to the client
(in Mr. Mahmudov's case, the entire $1200 requested had been raised
after six days); how much money remains to be loaned; and, interestingly,
the names and pictures of the people who have loaned money to date.
29
The minimum loan possible is $25; the maximum is the amount remaining
until the borrower obtains the full amount he has requested.
30
The lender transfers the loan using PayPal, which donates its services
24. These microfinance groups are a subset of charitable websites that allowed "fo-
cused charity" by permitting individuals to donate small amounts of money to particular
individuals in need. Other such sites, such as Donors Choose (donorschoose.org), Global
Giving (globalgiving.org), and Modest Needs (modestneeds.org), involve actual donations,
however, instead of loans, and are therefore outside the scope of this Article.
25. See, e.g., Village Banking Home Page, www.villagebanking.org (last visited Aug.
23, 2008); Accion Home Page, www.accion.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2008).
26. See, e.g., MicroPlace Home Page, https://www.microplace.com/learn-more/faq
(last visited Aug. 23, 2008); Prosper Home Page, http://www. prosper.com (last visited Aug.
23, 2008).
27. See Walker, supra note 5.
28. Kiva Description of Juraboy Mahmudov, http://www.kiva.org/app.php?page=busi-
nesses&action=about&id=35636 (last visited Aug. 6, 2008).
29. See id. For more on the "community" aspect of Kiva, see infra Section II.C.
30. Kiva Description of Juraboy Mahmudov, http://www.kiva.org/app.php?page=busi-
nesses&action=about&id=35636 (last visited Aug. 6, 2008).
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to Kiva. 31 The money goes to Kiva, but Kiva does not loan the money
directly to the ultimate borrower. Instead, Kiva transfers the money to a
"Kiva Field Partner," an established microfinance institution that on-
loans the money to the borrower. 32 The microfinance institution charges
interest to the borrower at "prevailing interest rates" and retains the in-
terest payments; Kiva does not charge the microfinance institution inter-
est. 33 The individual lender also receives no interest.34 Kiva has chosen
not to pay interest to the individual lender because offering interest pay-
ments might subject Kiva to registration and reporting requirements re-
lated to issuing securities. 35 If the borrower repays the loan, the
individual lender may either take the money out of Kiva, or may reinvest
it in a different loan (that is, reloan it).36
Because Kiva has chosen not to charge its field partners interest, Kiva's
only source of operating expenses and supplies is donations. Appropri-
ately for a business that owes much of its success to the social networking
power of the Internet, Kiva has many supporters in Silicon Valley who
provide in-kind contributions. For example, PayPal provides free pay-
ment processing; Google and YouTube have allowed Kiva to advertise for
free; Lenovo has donated computers; and the law firm of Orrick, Her-
rington & Sutcliffe LLP provides pro bono legal services. 37 Kiva has also
received large grants from various foundations. 38 Some individuals do-
nate to Kiva as well, many by adding "optional fees" to the loans that
they make through Kiva. 39
C. KIVA'S SUCCESS
By any metric, Kiva has been tremendously successful in its three years
of operation. As of August 2008, nearly 325,000 different people had
loaned money through Kiva, funding over 38,000 loans.40 Kiva partnered
with 89 microfinance institutions in 42 countries.4 1 The total value of all
31. Kiva, Completing the Payment Process, http://www.kiva.org/about/help/questions?
subtopic=Completing%20the%20Payment%20Process (last visited Aug. 6, 2008).
32. Kiva, Information for Prospective Field Partners, http://www.kiva.org/about/pic
(last visited Aug. 6, 2008).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Matt Flannery, Kiva and the Birth of Person-to-Person Microfinance, 2 INNOVA-
TIONS 31, 40-42 (2007) ("[I]f we return interest to users on the Internet, we run the risk of
being seen as a securities issuer and should really seek legal counsel before doing so....
[I]f we remove the interest rates from the service, the SEC would be unlikely to take notice
and consider the loans as securities. Given our lack of funding and the enormous complex-
ity of issuing securities ... [w]e would have to launch without interest rates on the site.").
36. Kiva, How Kiva Works, http://www.kiva.org/about/how (last visited Aug. 23, 2008).
37. Kiva, Supporters: Corporate Partners, http://www.kiva.org/about/supporters/ (last
visited Aug. 6, 2008).
38. Kiva, Supporters: Institutional Supporters, http://www.kiva.org/about/institutional/
(last visited Aug. 6, 2008).
39. Kiva, General Questions, http://www.kiva.org/about/help/questions?subtopic=
General%20Questions (last visited Aug. 6, 2008).





loans made through Kiva was over $38 million. 42 According to Kiva, as
of August 2008, 98.36% of its loans were repaid, with a default rate of
only 1.64%. 4 3 In December 2007, so many people wanted to make loans
through Kiva that Kiva "sold out" of loans.44 That is, people who wanted
to lend money through Kiva.org were temporarily unable to make loans
because all of the loans Kiva featured had been fully funded.
45
Not unrelatedly, Kiva has also received an overwhelming amount of
media coverage. As noted in the Introduction, many major newspapers
have featured stories about Kiva. 46 In addition, the founders of Kiva,
Matt and Jessica Flannery, have appeared on the Oprah Winfrey Show
with former President Clinton. 47 Matt Flannery has been named one of
Smithsonian magazine's "37 Under 36: America's Young Innovators in
the Arts and Sciences." 4
8
Finally, Kiva has created not just a flow of funds, but also a community
of lenders. The idea of community is central to Kiva's mission and, ar-
guably, to its success and popularity. Many Kiva borrowers are members
of small communities, and many of Kiva's field partners-that is, the
microfinance organizations to which Kiva loans, and which on-loan to
poor individuals-explain that their goal is to "facilitate[ ] communi-
ties,"'49 or to promote "community development. '50 Individual borrow-
ers also stress their "community" banks or other businesses. 51 Kiva
creates links between lenders and borrowers as well. As one of Kiva's
founders has written, Kiva's philosophy includes the tenet that "[1lending
is connecting," because "[1]ending to someone else creates an ongoing
communication between two individuals. ' '52 Finally, Kiva links lenders.
Kiva lenders view themselves as part of a community, and Kiva has taken
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Walker, supra note 5.
45. Id.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7.
47. The Oprah Winfrey Show (ABC television broadcast Sept. 4, 2007).
48. 37 Under 36: America's Young Innovators in the Arts & Sciences, http://microsite.
smithsonianmag.com/content/innovators/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2008); see also Amy Craw-
ford, I, Lender, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Sept. 22, 2007, at 92.
49. See, e.g., Kiva, Uganda: Share an Opportunity Microfinance Ltd., http://www.kiva.
org/about/aboutPartner?id=37 (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) ("Mission Statement: To facilitate
Communities to start and manage sustainable and responsive community-owned financial
institutions that create economic opportunities.").
50. See, e.g., Kiva, Nicaragua: ADEPHCA, http://www.kiva.org/about/aboutPartner?
id=76 (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) ("Within the communities ADEPHCA has promoted com-
munity development.") , Kiva, Vietnam: Mekong Plus, http://www.kiva.org/about/about
Partner?id=41 (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) ("Mainly focusing on community development
and individual participation in the community development process, Mekong Plus works
together with the ultra poor to create a more equal and sustainable world.").
51. See, e.g., Kiva, Kenneth Niwomujuni, http://www.kiva.org/app.php?page=busi-
nesses&action=about&id=2654 (last visited Aug. 6, 2008) ("Much interesting one to him is
his involvement in the community activities like bracelet making .... ); Kiva, Nueva Santa
Catarina Group, http://www.kiva.org/app.php?page=businesses&action=about&id=38065
(last visited Aug. 6, 2008) ("As a community bank, they are proud to have been together
eight years, their bank was the first of the now four banks in their small community.").
52. Flannery, supra note 35, at 40.
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advantage of social networking and "Web 2.0" approaches to build their
support base.5 3 Core to Kiva's strategy is developing what they call "a
community of passionate lenders. '54 Kiva lenders have their own web-
site, separate from Kiva, which, as the site itself explains, "supports
Kiva's mission of 'connecting people, through lending, for the sake of
alleviating poverty,' by creating a place where Kiva community members
can connect with one another. ' ' 55 Kiva lenders also have their own My-
Space page.5 6
III. TAX LAW AND KIVA: CHARITIES AND
INTEREST-FREE LOANS
Although Kiva is in many ways an innovative organization, much of the
tax law related to Kiva is straightforward. One aspect of Kiva's taxation,
however, presents a fascinating puzzle. This Part first discusses Kiva's tax
exempt status; the nondeductibility of loans to Kiva; and the appropriate
tax treatment of defaults on Kiva loans, all of which are noncontroversial.
This Part then turns to the tax treatment of lenders' foregone interest.
The result-that the foregone interest is nondeductible-is clear, but the
law that creates that result is fairly complicated, as interest-free loans to
Kiva fall at the intersection of at least two areas of tax law: the taxation of
charitable donations and the taxation of loans. To understand why the
foregone interest is nondeductible, Section B examines the tax law relat-
ing to charitable deductions, and Section C turns to the tax treatment of
below-market loans.
A. KIVA's BASIC TAX TREATMENT
This Section addresses three simple aspects of how Kiva and its lenders
are taxed. First, Kiva is a tax-exempt organization. 57 This means, obvi-
ously, that Kiva is not required to pay tax on its income.5 8 But perhaps
more importantly, Kiva is a tax-exempt organization described in Section
501(c)(3)-that is, it is a charitable organization, as opposed to another
type of tax-exempt organization, such as a chamber of commerce or busi-
ness league not organized for profit.59 As a result, donors to Kiva may,
53. Silverman, supra note 4.
54. See, e.g., Kiva, Kiva Lender: Rupa Moli, http://www.kiva.org/lender/rupa (last vis-
ited Aug. 9, 2008) (stating that her job is "Exploring East Coast Development for Kiva and
building a community of passionate lenders"); Kiva, Kiva Lender: Liz, http://www.kiva.org/
lender/liz6904 (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (listing her occupation as Kiva Customer Service
Manager and stating that she loves to share information with the "Kiva community"). The
word "community" appears throughout the Kiva website. See Kiva Home Page, supra
note 1.
55. Kiva Friends, About Kiva Friends, http://www.kivafriends.org/index.php?action=
about (last visited Aug. 9, 2008).
56. MySpace.com-Kiva, http://www.myspace.com/kivaloans (last visited Aug. 9, 2008).
57. Kiva, Terms of Use Agreement, § 1.3, http://www.kiva.org/about/termsofuse (last
visited Aug. 9, 2008).
58. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006).
59. See id. § 501(c)(6).
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subject to certain limitations, deduct contributions to Kiva from their
income. 60
Second, even though contributions to Kiva are deductible, loans made
through Kiva are not contributions to Kiva and are not deductible.
6 1
Loans in general are not deductible even if made for business purposes
because a loan does not reduce total assets. A person who makes a loan
has less cash, but he also has an offsetting note-that is, he does not have
cash, but someone owes him cash, so his net worth has not changed.
Thus, lenders are not permitted to take a charitable deduction for the
amount they loan to Kiva.
Third, Kiva takes the position that if the borrower defaults on the loan,
the individual lender may take a capital loss. 6 2 The lender was unable to
take a deduction for the initial loan because his net worth did not dimin-
ish; he expected that his money would be returned to him. Once the bor-
rower defaults and the lender knows that his own net worth has therefore
diminished, he may then take a deduction. He did not enter into the loan
to make a profit, however, so he would presumably take a short-term
capital loss, as the loan would be considered a nonbusiness bad debt.63
The resolution of each of these tax issues is relatively straightforward.
There is, however, one final piece of tax law related to Kiva that is more
complicated: the treatment of the interest that the lender foregoes by
lending money through Kiva interest-free. The lender cannot take a de-
duction for this foregone interest, but the underlying law is less than pel-
lucid. To understand why no deduction is available to the lender, we
must examine two different sections of the Code. The foregone interest is
in the nature of a donation to charity, so we must understand why no
deduction is permitted under the portion of the Code that discusses chari-
table deductions. But the Code also directly addresses tax treatment of
below-market loans, so we must understand whether the Code's tax treat-
ment of below-market loans applies to the lender's below-market (in-
deed, interest-free) loan to Kiva. Section B explains why the foregone
interest is not deductible as a charitable donation, and Section C explains
why the law relating to below-market loans does not apply to recharacter-
ize Kiva loans, notwithstanding that Kiva loans are below-market.
60. See id. § 170.
61. Kiva acknowledges this in its Terms of Use Agreement. Kiva, supra note 56, § 1.3
("[Blecause you are making a loan and not donating any money, you are not eligible to
receive a tax deduction as might otherwise be available in connection with a charitable
contribution to a tax-exempt public charity.").
62. See Kiva, Tracking Payments, http://www.kiva.org/about/help/questioons?subtop-
ics=Tracking%20Repayments (last visited Aug. 9, 2008).
63. See I.R.C. § 166(d). If the loans are in registered form, lenders may be able to
claim a long-term capital loss under Section 165(g). See id. § 165(g) (permitting a capital
loss if a bond, debenture, or note issued by a corporation that is in registered form be-
comes worthless). No loss should be allowed under Section 165, because the loss is not
incurred in a trade or business or in a transaction entered into for profit. See id. § 165(a)
(permitting deduction of losses sustained in the taxable year); id. § 165(c) (limiting losses
that may be taken by individuals to losses incurred in a trade or business, losses incurred in
a transaction entered into for profit, and casualty losses).
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B. FOREGONE INTEREST AS CHARITABLE DONATION
As a general rule, a taxpayer who donates property to a tax-exempt
organization is permitted to take a charitable deduction equal to the fair
market value of that property.64 What, though, is the thing of value that
the donor gives to the recipient of the loan through Kiva? It is obviously
not the full amount of the loan, because the borrower must pay that
amount back. Rather, it is the right to use the money for a period of
time. In short, the taxpayer donates the time value of his money.65
The right to use money for a period of time has value because money
can be invested and can create more money. This is why loans are useful
in the first place. The Tajikistani farmer who wants to borrow money to
buy mixed fodder borrows that money because he thinks that investing in
mixed fodder will, in the long run, provide him not only with enough
money to pay back the loan, but also with additional benefits. Holding
the money for a period of time allows him to generate more money.
Closer to home, if I have $100 today, I can put it in the bank and earn
interest on that money; $100 today will be worth $105 in a year if I earn
5% interest annually. I am being paid for the use of my money.
Thus, someone who loans $100 through Kiva and three years later re-
ceives his $100 back is foregoing the time value of that money. He could
have invested that money-perhaps by depositing it in a bank where it
would have earned interest. If he had earned 5% interest, compounded
annually, after three years he would have had $115.76. If he loans
through Kiva he therefore has $15.76 less at the end of three years that he
would otherwise have had. This is what he has donated by loaning money
interest-free through Kiva.
There are, however, limitations to the general rule that a taxpayer may
take a deduction equal to the fair market value of property donated to a
charity. In some situations, for example, the deduction is limited to the
basis of the property.66 (The taxpayer's basis usually represents post-tax
dollars invested in the property and is often equal to the amount the tax-
64. See id. § 170(a), (c). For some limitations to this general rule, see infra text accom-
panying note 66.
65. In some sense, then, it is not true that a lender through Kiva "break[s] even," as
the Wall Street Journal has suggested. See Liber, supra note 4.
66. If the property contributed would have generated ordinary income or short-term
capital gain if sold, the donor's deduction is limited to the basis of the property contrib-
uted. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A). The donor's deduction is also limited to his basis if he
contributes long-term capital gain property in four situations: first, if the property is tangi-
ble property and its use by the recipient organization is unrelated to that organization's tax
exempt purpose; second, if he contributes the property to a private foundation, unless the
foundation is a private operating foundation that promptly uses funds contributed to it;
third, if the property is a patent, copyright, trademark, or other similar intangible property;
and fourth, if the property is taxidermy property and the donor either stuffed the property
himself or paid to have the property stuffed. See id. § 170(e)(1)(B); see also Daniel
Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-




payer paid for the property67). And of particular interest for this Article,
no charitable deduction is available for the contribution of a partial inter-
est in property.68 For example, a taxpayer who owns an apartment build-
ing and donates the use of one floor of that building to a charity for one
year may not take a charitable deduction for the value of the use of the
floor.69 Indeed, the taxpayer would not receive a deduction even if he let
the charity use the entire building for one year because he did not donate
his entire interest in the property.
70
As the regulations make clear, an interest-free loan constitutes pre-
cisely the type of partial interest for which a deduction is prohibited: "D
loans $10,000 in cash to a charitable organization and does not require
the organization to pay any interest for the use of the money. Since D's
contribution consists of a partial interest ... he is not entitled to a charita-
ble contributions deduction for the contribution of such partial inter-
est. '" 71 Thus, even though the lender has doubtless given something of
value through Kiva, he may not take a deduction for the interest he
foregoes by lending money through Kiva interest-free.
C. ESCAPING BELOW-MARKET LOAN RECHARACTERIZATION
The Code provides another way to think of an interest-free loan, and
thus another way to characterize the lender's donation to Kiva. The
Code recharacterizes a variety of transactions to take into account the
time value of money. Without this recharacterization, it would be all too
easy to avoid taxes. One transaction that the Code recharacterizes is be-
low-market loans. As the following discussion explains, the statutory
recharacterization of below-market loans does not apply to interest-free
loans to organizations such as Kiva because Kiva's interest-free loans do
not have a significant effect on either the lender's or Kiva's tax liability,
as will be discussed further below. The actual discussion will be some-
what technical, but perhaps also somewhat interesting, because the
Code's conceptual approach to below-market loans may help us better
understand the lenders' interest-free loans to Kiva.
Section 7872 recharacterizes certain below-market loans to prevent tax
avoidance.72 For example, without the rules of Section 7872, it would be
67. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1012 (defining a property's basis as the cost of that property,
adjusted as provided elsewhere in the Code); id. § 1016(a) (stating that a property's basis
must be adjusted for certain events, such as depreciation).
68. Id. § 170(f)(3)(A).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(d), ex. 1 (as amended in 1999).
70. Id. § 1.170A-7(a)(1).
71. Id. § 1.170A-7(d), ex. 3.
72. See I.R.C. § 7872 (2006 & Supp. 2007); see also J. COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at
527 (Comm. Print 1985) ("A below-market loan is the economic equivalent of a loan bear-
ing a market rate of interest, and a payment by the lender to the borrower to fund the
payment of interest by the borrower. The Congress believed that ... the failure of the tax
laws to treat these transactions in accordance with their economic substance provided tax-
payers with opportunities to circumvent well-established tax rules.").
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easy to sidestep the prohibition on assignment of income. 73 If a parent
earns $5 million a year, and his child earns very little, the child's marginal
tax bracket will be much less than the parent's marginal tax bracket. It
will therefore be in the parent's interest to assign income to his child,
instead of including that income as his own. If he earns $50,000, he will
pay $17,500 of federal income tax if he is in the highest tax bracket. But if
the parent assigns his $50,000 earnings to his child, and the child, instead
of the parent, earns the $50,000, the low-bracket child could pay as little
as about $6000 of federal income tax (if she has no other income or de-
ductions). The tax law does not permit this type of income-shifting. If
the parent earns the money, the parent must include it in his income and
pay tax at his income tax rate. After he pays tax on his income he may of
course choose to give it to his child, but that gift will be nondeductible by
the parent (and not includible in the child's taxable income).
Interest-free loans can create the same kind of income-shifting as the
outright assignment of income. Imagine, for example, that a wealthy par-
ent in the top tax bracket makes a $1,000,000 loan to his child, who is in
school and earns no money. Under the terms of the loan, the child must
repay the $1,000,000 in three years, but will owe no interest. If this trans-
action were respected as a simple loan, the transaction would not appear
on anyone's tax return, as loans are neither deductible by the lender nor
includible by the borrower. The child could invest the $1,000,000 and get
an annual return of, say, 5%. She would earn $50,000 a year, all of which
would be taxable at her tax rate, not her father's, just as in the scenario in
which the father simply gives his child $50,000 a year.74 If the high-earn-
ing parent had kept the $1,000,000 and invested it at a 5% return, he
would have had to pay tax on the return at his marginal rate, which could
be as high as 35% (or tax of about $17,500). But by transferring the
$1,000,000 to his child, he has avoided this taxable income.
The Code prevents this by recharacterizing some interest-free loans as
a series of payments between the two parties to the loan.75 Below-mar-
ket loans (that is, loans that bear an interest rate less than a specified
rate)76 are divided into two types: gift loans and demand loans on the one
hand, and other interest-free loans on the other.77 A gift loan is a "be-
low-market loan where the forgoing of the interest is in the nature of a
gift."'78 A charitable donation is, for these purposes, a gift. 79 A below-
73. See, e.g., J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 72, at 527. For an explanation of the
prohibition on assignment of income, see Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-20 (1940).
74. For purposes of this example, assume that the "kiddy tax" does not apply. See
I.R.C. § 1(g) (2006) (taxing the unearned income of a child who is under eighteen, or who
is a student and under age twenty-four).
75. Adding a third party does not prevent the recharacterization.
76. See I.R.C. § 7872(e)(1), (f)(2) (defining "below-market loan" and "applicable fed-
eral rate").
77. Compare id. § 7872(a) (addressing gift loans and demand loans), with id. § 7872(b)(addressing "other below-market loans").
78. Id. § 7872(f)(3).
79. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 72, at 527 ("In general, there is a gift [for gift-
loan purposes] if property (including foregone interest) is transferred for less than full and
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market loan to a charity such as Kiva is therefore a gift loan because the
foregone interest is in the nature of a gift.
Section 7872 bifurcates gift loans. On the last day of each year, the
foregone interest is treated as first transferred from the lender to the bor-
rower, and then retransferred by the borrower to the lender as interest.
80
The foregone interest, which is compounded semiannually, accrues on the
full amount of the loan at the "applicable federal rate,"8 1 which is set
monthly by the Treasury and is based on the market yield of U.S. bonds.
82
The taxation of the first transfer-from the lender to the borrower-is
determined based on the underlying substance of the transaction.
Returning to our example of the parent lending his child $1,000,000,
assume that the parent makes the loan on January 1, and that the applica-
ble federal rate is 4.94% compounded semiannually.8 3 In that first year,
the parent is treated as having loaned the child $1,000,000, and also hav-
ing transferred $50,000 to her. She is then treated as having transferred
$50,000 in interest back to the parent. The taxation of the $50,000 trans-
fer from the parent to the child is determined by looking at the underly-
ing facts of the transaction. In this situation, the transfer should almost
certainly be treated as a gift. (Gift treatment is not the only possible
treatment, though; one could imagine, say, a transfer from an employer to
an employee that is treated as compensation, or any number of other
possibilities.) As a gift, the $50,000 is not deductible by the parent and is
not includible by the child.84 The child's interest payment is includible by
the parent. At the end of the transaction, the parent has $50,000 of in-
come, taxed at his income tax rate. If the child has invested the
$1,000,000, she will also have $50,000 of income.
If Section 7872 applied to interest-free loans to Kiva,8 5 foregone inter-
est would be treated as first transferred from the lender to Kiva, and then
from Kiva to the lender. The transfer from Kiva to the lender would be
an interest payment, taxable to the lender. It might be deductible by
Kiva, but that wouldn't matter, because Kiva is a tax-exempt entity and
therefore is generally not concerned about how much otherwise taxable
income it has. The interest would be includible by the lender.
To determine the appropriate treatment of the deemed transfer from
the lender to Kiva, we must look at the underlying transaction. Here, the
adequate consideration under circumstances where the transfer is a gift for gift tax pur-
poses."). Charitable donations are gifts for gift tax purposes, although they are deductible
in many instances. See, e.g., 1.R.C. § 2512(b) (2006) (defining a gift as a transfer "for less
than adequate and full consideration"); id. § 2522 (permitting a deduction for gift tax pur-
poses for gifts made to charitable organizations, under certain circumstances).
80. Id. § 7872(a).
81. Id. § 7872(e)(2)(A)-(B).
82. Id. § 1274(d).
83. This would be the short-term applicable federal rate compounded semiannually.
84. See I.R.C. § 102 (stating that "[g]ross income does not include the value of prop-
erty acquired by gift").




underlying transaction is clearly a charitable donation. It might initially
appear that the lender would not be able to deduct the deemed charitable
donation because of the prohibition on the deduction of the donation of
partial interests.8 6 However, as the Joint Committee on Taxation has ex-
plained, this is not accurate. Rather, "Congress intended that, [in] the
case of a below-market loan to a [Slection 501(c)(3) organization, the
deemed payment from the lender to the borrower be treated as a contri-
bution of cash and not as a contribution of a partial interest in property to
which [S]ection 170(f)(3)(A) would apply."'87 Therefore, if Section 7872
applied to interest-free loans to Kiva, the deemed interest payment from
Kiva to the lender would be offset by the deemed charitable deduction of
the payment from the lender to Kiva. In other words, the lender's taxa-
ble income would not change (because the interest payment would be
entirely offset by the charitable deduction), and Kiva's taxable income
would not change (because Kiva does not pay tax). 88
Section 7872 does not, however, apply to loans to Kiva. Gift loans to a
charitable organization such as Kiva are generally considered to have no
"significant effect" on the federal tax liability of either the borrower or
the lender, 89 and thus escape the recharacterization imposed by Section
7872.90 This result is consistent with an analysis of the individual factors
considered to determine whether a below-market loan has a significant
tax effect. These factors include "whether items of income and deduction
generated by the loan offset each other"; the amount of the income and
deduction items; the cost of complying with Section 7872 (if compliance
were required); and "any non-tax reasons for deciding to structure the
transaction as a below-market loan .... 91
In the case of loans to Kiva, the lender's interest income would be off-
set entirely, or almost entirely (depending on the application of percent-
age limitations), by the charitable deduction. The amount of foregone
interest is not large, at least as Kiva currently operates. The average total
loaned by a Kiva lender is about $100.92 The current applicable federal
86. See discussion supra Section III.B.; see also S.J. Willbanks, Interest-Free Loans Are
No Longer Free, 47 MONT. L. REV. 39, 69-70 (1986) (citing Section 170(f)(3)'s prohibition
on a deduction for donations of partial interests to support the claim that "[i]f the tax-
payer-lender loans a charitable organization $500,000, interest-free, payable on demand,
when the applicable interest rate is ten percent, he is deemed to make a non-deductible
contribution of $50,000").
87. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 72, at 530.
88. It is possible that the charitable deduction would not completely offset the interest
income if, for example, the taxpayer's total charitable contributions exceeded a certain
percentage of his income. See I.R.C. § 170(b).
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(b)(9) (as amended in 1988). This exception applies only if
the aggregate amount of loans by the lender to the organization outstanding during the
year does not exceed $250,000. Id.
90. See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(E).
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(c)(3); see also J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 72, at
531-32 (listing the same four reasons).
92. Kiva, supra note 39 (stating that the average total amount loaned per Kiva lender
is $127.48) (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
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rate is less than 2%. 93 So even if we assume that the Kiva lender loans
that $100 in a single year, the average foregone interest each year that
would have to be included and deducted if Section 7872 applied is ap-
proximately $2. 94 The cost of complying with Section 7872 could be sig-
nificant for the lenders, as they might have to pay someone for tax advice
to understand how Section 7872 applied to their situation. And finally,
the loans to Kiva are structured as interest-free loans for non-tax reasons:
to avoid running afoul of securities regulations.
95
Thus, Section 7872 does not apply to recharacterize the interest-free
loans to Kiva. However, as we will see in the next Part, the concepts
underlying Section 7872's general rule of recharacterization will come
into play as we discuss reforming the law that applies to interest-free
loans to charities.
IV. REFORMING THE LAW OF PARTIAL
INTEREST DONATIONS
This Part argues that the law should be changed to permit charitable
deductions for interest-free loans to microfinance charities such as Kiva.
Section A describes why microfinance loans should be added to the ex-
ceptions that already exist to the general rule denying a deduction for
donation of partial interests. Section B describes several ways this
change could be implemented and concludes that the simplest and best
way to permit deductions for interest-free loans to microfinance organiza-
tions is to permit the lender to deduct the amount of the loan in the year
it is made and require the lender to include that amount in his taxable
income the year the loan is repaid.
A. CHANGING THE LAW FOR INTEREST-FREE MICROFINANCE LOANS
This Section explains why the law should be changed to allow charita-
ble deductions for interest foregone on loans to microfinance charitable
organizations such as Kiva. First, microfinance should be supported from
a policy perspective. Second, foregone interest on microfinance loans is
conceptually consistent with the other exceptions that already exist to the
general rule barring charitable deductions for the donation of partial in-
terests. And third, administrative problems that might vitiate against per-
mitting deductions for partial interests in general do not exist when it
comes to permitting deductions for foregone interest.
The Code already contains three exceptions to the general rule forbid-
ding deductions for donations of partial interests, so adding an exception
would not be unprecedented. As originally enacted, the rule included
two exceptions: deductions were permitted for the contribution of a re-
mainder interest in a personal residence or farm, and for an undivided
93. Rev. Rul. 2008-20, 2008-14 I.R.B. 716 (stating that the short-term AFR com-
pounded semiannually was 1.84% for April 2008).
94. The foregone interest on $118.45 at 1.84% compounded semiannually is $2.19.
95. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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portion of the taxpayer's entire interest in property. 96 Additional excep-
tions were added over the years. In 1976, new exceptions were added for
donation of a lease, option, or easement with respect to real property of
at least thirty years, to be used exclusively for conservation purposes, and
for donation of a remainder interest in real property.97 "Conservation
purposes" meant the preservation of land for outdoor enjoyment, the
preservation of historically important land or buildings, or the protection
of natural environmental systems. 98 Finally, in 1980, the two 1976 excep-
tions were combined to permit a deduction for a partial interest if that
partial interest was a "qualified conservation contribution," 99 which was
defined as a contribution of certain real property to certain tax-exempt
organizations exclusively for conservation purposes. 100
Legislative history does not explain the initial reasons for these excep-
tions, but presumably Congress believed that these types of donations
were particularly important and should be encouraged. As discussed
above, microfinance appears to be a powerful way to alleviate poverty.'01
There is also a distinct shortage of lenders: the worldwide "demand for
loans . . . far outstrips [the] supply.' 02
An additional impetus for the conservation easement exception also
supports creating an exception to the general partial interest deduction
ban for loans to charitable organizations such as Kiva. Congress shed
some light on the thinking behind the conservation easement exception
when it extended that provision in 1977:
[I]t is intended that a contribution of a conservation easement or
remainder interest qualify for a deduction only if the holding of the
easement (or, in the case of a remainder interest, the property) is
related to the purpose or function constituting the donee's purpose
for exemption (organizations such as nature conservancies, environ-
mental, [sic] and historic trusts, State and local governments, etc.)
and the donee is able to enforce its rights as holder of the easement
or remainder interest and protect the conservation purposes which
the contribution is intended to advance. The requirement that the
contribution be exclusively for conservation purposes is also in-
96. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 483, 549 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B) (2006)).
97. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(e)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1989
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)).
98. Id. (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)). The provision was initially
temporary, but then was extended to June 14, 1981. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 309, 91 Stat. 126, 154 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 170(h)(2)(C)).
99. Pub. L. No. 96-541, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3204, 3206 (1980) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii)).
100. Pub. L. No. 96-541, § 6(b), 94 Stat. 3204, 3206 (1980) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 170(h)).
101. See supra Section III.A.
102. Thomas Kostigen, Microfinance Ignored: Demand for Loans Around the World Far





tended to limit deductible contributions to those transfers which re-
quire that the donee hold the easement (or, in the case of a
remainder interest, the property) exclusively for conservation pur-
poses (i.e., that they not be transferable by the donee in exchange for
money, other property, or services). 10 3
In other words, a deduction for the donation of a conservation ease-
ment is permitted only if the partial interest is itself for conservation pur-
poses and does not merely support conservation. This description also
applies to loans to Kiva. Unlike many other partial interest donations,
the benefit that Kiva supplies is precisely a partial interest. This is a dif-
ferent situation than someone permitting a soup kitchen to use a floor of
a building rent-free for a limited period of time. In that situation, the
provision of the building permits the soup kitchen to pursue its ultimate
tax-exempt purpose, feeding the hungry. But the provision of funds for a
limited period of time is precisely Kiva's tax-exempt purpose. Thus, ad-
ding an exception to the partial interest deduction ban to permit a deduc-
tion for foregone interest on loans to charities such as Kiva would be
consistent with current exceptions to the general provision.
Additionally, administrative problems that might plague other deduc-
tions for partial interests, problems relating to valuation and control,
would not be an issue for a deduction for foregone interest. The value of
foregone interest is easy to measure (and indeed, if the method suggested
in Section B were adopted, there would be no valuation issue at all' 04),
and there would be no question that the lender had given up control of
the partial interest.
There are at least two problems related to the valuation of property
donated to charity. First, a taxpayer who may deduct the fair market
value of property donated to charity has a strong incentive to overvalue
that property for purposes of his tax return. Second, and relatedly, tax-
payers and the government can value property available on the open
market with relative ease, but it is more difficult to value property not
generally offered in the market, whether because that property is unique
or because that type of property is not widely traded. The government
has attempted to address the fact that taxpayers may overstate the value
of property donated to charity by, among other approaches, imposing va-
rious substantiation requirements for property that is not "readily val-
ued." 10 5 One can certainly imagine, however, that valuing partial
interests might be particularly difficult; for example, it might be possible
103. H.R. REP. No. 95-263, at 30-31 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 287, 295.
104. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.b.
105. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(f)(11) (2006) (requiring, for charitable deduction purposes,
appraisal and documentation of the donation of certain property that is not "readily val-
ued"); see also Matthew L. Wald, Tax Scheme Is Blamed for Damage to Artifacts, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb. 4, 2008, at El (describing a scheme in which "smugglers and art dealers were
selling prehistoric artifacts to Americans, who were provided with inflated appraisals.
Then the art dealers arranged for the items to be donated to museums, so the donors could
take a tax deduction.").
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to determine the market value of a used car donated to a charity, but it
would be more difficult to determine the market value of permitting the
charity free use of that car for a few days a week. And if a taxpayer could
find an appraiser who would put a high value on that use, it might be
difficult for the government to challenge successfully the taxpayer's
deduction.
Permitting a deduction for foregone interest would not raise such valu-
ation concerns, however. The market rate for money (that is, the interest
rate) is readily available, and in fact, as described above, the IRS already
issues a monthly interest rate that taxpayers must use to address various
tax timing issues. 10 6 (Thus, unsurprisingly, the IRS does not require ap-
praisal of cash donated to charities; cash is, of course, the quintessential
"readily valued" property.)' 0 7 Moreover, as discussed below, separate
valuation of the foregone interest might be completely unnecessary, de-
pending on how the deduction is implemented. 0 8
Taxpayers may also abuse the charitable deduction by retaining control
over putatively donated items. For example, taxpayers have attempted to
claim charitable deductions for property transferred to foundations and
churches over which the taxpayers retained control. 10 9 This is of course
impermissible; as the Eleventh Circuit has explained, a deductible chari-
table contribution "must be one over which the contributor has surren-
dered dominion and control." 110 Donations of partial interests seem
particularly likely to trigger this concern. For example, it would be ex-
tremely difficult for the government to know that the charity really had
full use of a car a few days a week, as opposed to the charity's having to
bring the car back to the donor if he decided that he needed to use it on a
particular day.11 '
Permitting a deduction for foregone interest would not, however, cre-
ate control monitoring problems for the government. Below-market
lenders like Kiva lenders transfer their funds to a separate entity, an en-
tity over which they have no control. And not only do the lenders not
control the entity, they also do not control the funds while the money is
with the tax-exempt organization (that is, the borrower). Thus, allowing
a charitable deduction for foregone interest would avoid the control con-
106. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
107. Id. § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii) (excepting from the rules requiring appraisal "readily val-
ued property," which includes cash).
108. See infra Subsection IV.B.2 (discussing the "Deduct-Include" method).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Estate Pres. Servs., 202 F.2d 1093, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2000)
(foundations); Pollard v. Comm'r, 786 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (11th Cir. 1986) (churches).
110. Pollard, 786 F.2d at 1067.
111. Cf Miller v. Comm'r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1207 (1975) (denying a charitable deduc-
tion for radios purchased for use in the taxpayer's home for Civil Air Patrol activities, on
the grounds that the equipment "could ... be inexpensively converted to frequencies other
than those assigned to the Civil Air Patrol .... A change in crystals would allow petitioner
to maintain and use the equipment in any manner .... [I]t was petitioner who controlled
use of the equipment.").
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cerns that might attend charitable deductions for partial interests in
general.
In conclusion, an exception for interest foregone on microfinance loans
should be added to the rule barring charitable deductions for partial in-
terests for at least three reasons. Microfinance should be supported; an
exception for foregone interest on microfinance loans is consistent with
already extant exceptions to the rule; and the nature of foregone interest
avoids administrative problems that might plague other deductions for
the donation of partial interests.
B. IMPLEMENTING THE CHANGE
This Section examines two possible ways that the deduction for fore-
gone interest could be implemented and concludes that the best way to
implement the deduction would be to permit a lender to deduct the loan
when it is made and require him to include it in income when it is repaid.
1. The Deemed Interest Method
One way to permit a charitable deduction for foregone interest would
be to modify the approach already used for certain below-market loans,
but to eliminate the deemed interest payment from the borrower to the
lender. As discussed above, Section 7872 of the Code recharacterizes
some interest-free loans (though not interest-free loans to charities) as
two transfers: first, a transfer from the lender to the borrower, character-
ized to reflect the underlying substance of the transaction, and second, a
transfer from the borrower to the lender of a deemed interest pay-
ment.'" 2 One way to implement a deduction for foregone interest on be-
low-market loans to Kiva and similar microfinance charities would be to
allow a deemed yearly transfer from the lender to Kiva of the amount of
foregone interest and permit this to be recharacterized as a charitable
deduction. As discussed above, this would not run afoul of the rule
against the deduction of partial interests because the Code considers such
a transfer to be a transfer of cash, not a transfer of a partial interest. Of
course, for this recharacterization to benefit the lender, the second part of
the transaction-the deemed transfer of interest from borrower to
lender-would have to be eliminated. We might call this approach the
"Deemed Interest Method."
There are, however, several problems with this method of providing a
deduction for Kiva lenders. First, it would be difficult for lenders to im-
plement. The provisions of Section 7872 are not easily understood. The
same can be said about many provisions of the Code, but a simpler way of
implementing the deduction might still be preferable.
The second problem with the Deemed Interest Method, however, is
more serious: it might provide a benefit to taxpayers who should not actu-
ally receive a benefit. To see why, think for a moment about why the
112. See supra Section lI.B.
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lender receives a charitable deduction for his foregone interest: he re-
ceives that deduction because he is giving away something of value that
he would otherwise have gotten the benefit of. But not all lenders will
receive income from their money if they do not lend it to Kiva. Think of
a lender who is trying to decide whether to loan $100 to Kiva. There are
many things he could do with the money if he did not lend it to Kiva. He
could deposit it in a bank and receive interest on it. He could invest in
some other way-perhaps in the stock market-and earn a return on it.
If those were his only options (loan to Kiva, deposit in interest-bearing
account, invest in stock market), he is giving up money by loaning it to
Kiva instead of taking the other two options. He has given up something
of value, and a deduction is appropriate.
But what if he is choosing between either loaning the money to Kiva or
depositing it in a non-interest-bearing account? In that case, he is not
giving up income by loaning the money to Kiva. This year he has $100.
Whether he deposits the money in a non-interest-bearing account or
loans it to Kiva, in two years he will have $100. He has given up nothing
by loaning the money to Kiva. He would not have derived any time value
from the money because it would have been sitting in a non-interest-bear-
ing account.
It is even possible that our imaginary lender has no plans to keep the
money at all if he does not loan it to Kiva. He might be choosing be-
tween loaning the money to Kiva and buying himself a nice dinner. In-
stead of using the money to generate income, he is using the money for
consumption in the current year. In that case, he certainly is not giving
up anything by loaning the money interest-free to Kiva.113
In either of the latter two cases, the lender would not be taking advan-
tage of the time value of money if he did not loan to Kiva. Therefore,
allowing him a charitable deduction would not be appropriate, as he
would be giving up nothing by lending the money to Kiva.
113. It may be more accurate to say that he is not giving up anything financial. He may
be reducing his overall welfare, if eating a steak dinner this year would give him more net
pleasure than eating a steak dinner in three years. Alternatively, he may be increasing his
overall welfare by loaning the money to Kiva, if the anticipation of a nice dinner three
years hence provides him with increased utility in the three years leading up to the dinner,
or if he would have squandered the money had he not loaned it to Kiva, and so is increas-
ing his utility by assuring himself that he will have cash in the future. The latter might be
why some people are happy to receive tax refunds, even though someone who receives a
tax refund gets that money only because he has, in effect, made an interest-free loan to the
government. The question of whether and how much a person prefers something today
over something in the future is the question of "discounting." For a general discussion of
discounting, see, for example, Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of
the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267,
277-79 (1993). For a more in-depth discussion see, for example, the essays collected in the
Intergenerational Equity and Discounting Symposium issue of the University of Chicago
Law Review, 74 U. CI. L. REV. 1 (2007).
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2. A Better Approach: Deduct and Include
a. The Method
A different method of structuring the deduction would be easier to im-
plement, would effectively deny a deduction to anyone who would not
have taken advantage of the time value of money absent the loan to Kiva,
and would accurately capture the actual time value of the lender's fore-
gone interest. Specifically, the lender should be permitted to deduct the
loan from his income in the year in which he makes the loan and required
to include it in his income when it is repaid. 114
Take, for example, our $100 lender. Assume his tax rate is 20%. Con-
sider five possible options: (1) he holds his money and neither invests it
nor loans it through Kiva, (2) he invests his money and receives a 5%
return, (3) he loans his money through Kiva and, as under current law,
receives no interest, (4) he loans his money through Kiva and is permitted
to deduct the foregone interest each year (this is the Deemed Interest
Method discussed above), or finally, our preferred option, (5) he loans his
money through Kiva and is permitted to take an ordinary deduction in
the amount of the loan in year one, but must include the return of princi-
pal as ordinary income in year two (we might call this the "Deduct-In-
clude Method"). 115
If, as in option one, the taxpayer does not invest his money at all, he
will have $100 in year one and $100 in year two.
If, as in option two, he invests his money and receives a 5% annual
return, he will receive a $5 return in year one, on which he will owe tax of
$1 (20% of $5). In year two, he will therefore have $100 (his initial
amount) plus $5 (the amount of interest he earned) minus $1 (the tax he
owed on the interest he earned), or $104.
Now imagine that current law applies, and the lender lends the money
through Kiva and receives no interest or charitable deduction. (This is
option three.) He will have $100 in year one, and when he gets his money
back in year two, he will also have $100. He has lost the time value of his
money which, after tax, was $4.
114. This is analogous to two different ways to implement a consumption tax: a govern-
ment can forbid expensing but not tax yield, or the government can permit expensing and
tax yield. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Con-
sumption Tax, 102 TAX NoTEs 91, 99-100 (2004) (discussing the "Cary Brown Theorem").
115. To be more precise, the law could provide that the lender would be required to
include the return of principal in income only if he received a tax benefit from the deduc-
tion in year one. Someone who does not itemize his deductions, for example, would have
received no tax benefit from the year-one charitable deduction and thus should not be
required to include the principal in his income when it is repaid. This could be imple-
mented in terms similar to the current tax benefit rule. See I.R.C. § 111 (providing that
"gross income does not include income attributable to the recovery ... of any amount
deducted in any prior taxable year to the extent" that the prior year's deduction resulted in
no tax benefit). For the sake of simplicity, consistent with the current approach in Section
111, the Deduct-Include Method as proposed here does not adjust for rate changes. Thus a
taxpayer who is in a lower tax bracket in year two enjoys a windfall, and a taxpayer in a
higher bracket in year two pays more tax than he saved in year one.
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Options four and five, the Deemed Interest Method and the Deduct-
Include Method, respectively, are two different methods of implementing
the proposed change in law that would permit a deduction for foregone
interest.
Under option four, the Deemed Interest Method described above in
Subsection 1, the law would change to permit a charitable deduction of
the foregone interest. The lender will have $100 in year one. He will
forego $5 of interest in year one, and will thus receive a charitable deduc-
tion of $5. This will offset $5 of other income, which will save him $1 in
tax. Therefore, in year two, he will have $101 as a result of his loan.
Imagine now that, as in option five, the Deduct-Include Method, we
permit the lender to deduct the $100 in year one, but require him to in-
clude that amount in year two, when his principal is returned. At first,
this seems to provide a different result than option four, the Deemed
Interest Method. If he loans $100 in year one and can deduct that
amount, he will be able to offset his income by $100, and thus will save
$20 in tax (20%, his tax rate, times $100, the amount of his deduction).
He can invest this $20. At a 5% rate of return, he will receive $1 of
income. But he will be taxed on this income, so he will net only $0.80. In
year two, when he is required to include the return of principal in his
income, he will have to pay an additional $20 of tax. He can, of course,
just use the $20 he saved in year one, so that tax should not cause him any
concern. But his total at the end of this whole process will be $100.80, not
$101.
The lender can get the identical net result under the Deduct-Include
Method as under the Deemed Interest Method, however, if he lends $125
instead of $100.116 (We can call this option 5b.) In that case, he will be
able to deduct $125 in year one. This will save him $25 in tax. He can
invest this, and, at a 5% rate of return, will receive $1.25. He will owe tax
on this amount, of course. Specifically, he will owe 20% of $1.25, or
$0.25. Thus he will net $1. In year two, he will be required to include the
$125 in income, at which point he will owe $25 in tax. But this won't be a
problem; he can use the $25 of tax he saved in year one. And he will have
netted $101. In other words, the lender can receive exactly the same
treatment as if he loaned $100 and was permitted to deduct the deemed
foregone interest each year.
116. This assumes that the lender has enough liquidity to loan $125 instead of $100,
knowing that in a few years he will be in precisely the same net position as if he had loaned
$100. Obviously, if the lender has no additional funds to lend, he cannot increase his loan
to arrive at the same net result under the Deduct-Include Method as under the Deemed
Interest Method.
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Year 1 Year 2
Return on Deduct Tax Net Include Tax Total
Investment Year I in Gain
(Taxable) Income
Baseline Option 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Scenarios No Investment
Option 2 $5 $0 ($1) $4 $0 $0 $4
Invest $100,
5% Return
Current Law: Option 3 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
No $100 Loan to
Charitable Kiva, No
Deduction Interest
Option 4: $0 $5 $1 (tax $1 $0 $0 $1
Deemed (imputed savings from
Interest foregone income offset
Method interest) by deduction)
$100 Loan to
Proposed Kiva
Law: Option 5a: $1 ($20 $100 $20 + (0.20) = $20.80 $100 ($20) $0.80
Charitable Deduct-Include saved tax (amount $19.80
Deduction of Method invested at of loan)
Foregone $100 Loan to 5% return)
Interest Kiva
Option 5b: $1.25 ($25 $125 $25 + ($0.25) $26 $125 ($25) $1
Deduct-Include saved tax (amount = $24.75
Method invested at of loan)
$125 Loan to 5% return)
Kiva
In conclusion, as the above chart shows, a taxpayer who loans $100 to
Kiva under current law is in the same position as a taxpayer who does not
invest his money at all. If the law were changed to permit a charitable
deduction for the Kiva lender's foregone interest, that deduction could be
implemented in two different ways-either the Deemed Interest Method
or the Deduct-Include Method. As the next Subsection explains, the De-
duct-Include Method is the superior approach.
b. Advantages to the Deduct-Include Method
There are a number of advantages to using the Deduct-Include Method
rather than permitting deduction of foregone interest each year. The De-
duct-Include Method is simpler to implement than the Deemed Interest
Method; it is more accurate; and it simplifies the tax situation if the bor-
rower defaults while leaving largely unchanged the ultimate tax effect of
a default.
First, the method is simpler to implement for both the IRS and the
taxpayer. The IRS need be concerned about only one year: the year of
inclusion. And the taxpayer does not need to file a separate form or try
to figure out how much imaginary interest he should deduct each year.
Because the method is simpler for the IRS to monitor, it would be less
likely to result in underpayment of tax. And because it is simpler for the
Money for Nothing
taxpayer, taxpayers would be more likely to use it, which might in turn
mean that the charitable deduction performed the job it was meant to
perform: encouraging charitable donations.
Second, the Deduct-Include Method is more accurate than deeming in-
terest payments each year in two ways, one IRS-friendly, one taxpayer-
friendly. The IRS should prefer the Deduct-Include Method over the
Deemed Interest Method, which would permit a yearly deduction for
deemed foregone interest, because the yearly deduction under the
Deemed Interest Method would give all taxpayers a tax benefit, even
those who would have, say, let their $100 sit in an interest-free account. 117
In contrast, the Deduct-Include Method would provide no benefit to tax-
payers who would not have gotten any financial time value from their
money had they not lent it to Kiva. In other words, these taxpayers are
not actually giving anything up by loaning money through Kiva, and
therefore they should not receive a charitable deduction. This is the case
because any benefit to the lender depends on that lender's investing the
money he saves from deducting the principal amount of his loan in year
one. If he does not invest his saved taxes, his tax savings in year one will
be completely offset by the inclusion of principal when the loan is repaid
and he will have no benefit from the loan at all.
The Deduct-Include Method can also be more accurate in a way that
helps taxpayers. The examples above assume that the deemed interest
rate would equal the rate of return the taxpayer would have received had
he not made the charitable loan and had instead invested his money. But
if the Deemed Interest Method followed current Section 7872 and many
other Code sections that impute interest, the imputed interest rate would
equal the applicable federal rate. The applicable federal rate is the mar-
ket yield on outstanding marketable securities of the United States. 118
Securities of the United States, that is, Treasury bills and the like, have
zero default risk and therefore have a relatively low yield.' 19 A taxpayer
who is willing to bear some default risk would be able to invest his money
and receive a better yield.
Let us compare the Deemed Interest Method and the Deduct-Include
Method again, but this time, imagine that the deemed interest rate and
the rate of return available on the market do not match. We have seen
that if the rate of return is zero (which is, of course, less than the deemed
interest rate), the taxpayer does better using the Deemed Interest
Method and the IRS does better if the taxpayer uses the Deduct-Include
Method. But what if the rate of return the taxpayer would have obtained
117. See supra Subsection IV.B.1.
118. I.R.C. § 1274(d).
119. For example, the short-term applicable federal rate for April 2008 for semiannual
compounding was 1.84%. Rev. Rul. 2008-20, 2008-14 I.R.B. 716. In other words, the aver-
age market yield for outstanding marketable obligations of the United States with remain-
ing periods to maturity of three years or less was 1.84%. Putting the saved tax in a money




is greater than the deemed interest rate? Imagine, for example, that the
deemed interest rate is 5%, but the taxpayer could actually invest the
money and receive a rate of return of 10%.
Nothing would change for the taxpayer under Option 4, the Deemed
Interest Method. Whatever the taxpayer did, he would be deemed to
have foregone $5 of interest in year one and would receive a charitable
deduction of $5, saving him $1 of tax. He would still have $101 in year
two.
Now let us go to the equivalent implementation of the Deduct-Include
Method, in which the lender lends $125 in year one and saves $25 in tax.
If he can get a 10% rate of return investing on the market, he will receive
$2.50 in interest, on which he will owe tax of $0.50. He will therefore net
$2, as opposed to the $1 he receives under the deemed interest deduction
method. Why is this? It is because the taxpayer is getting the actual time
value of his money, not the imaginary time value that the deemed interest
provides. Just as the Deduct-Include Method requires the taxpayer who
does not invest his money to live with the consequences of that decision
(by providing him no tax benefit for allowing Kiva to use his money), so it
permits the taxpayer who invests his money well to obtain the benefits of
that investment.
Finally, if the borrower defaults, the taxpayer need do nothing to re-
ceive the appropriate tax treatment under the Deduct-Include Method;
he simply never includes the principal in his income. Under current law,
if the borrower defaults, the taxpayer takes a bad debt deduction in the
year of default.120 This is appropriate under current law because there
was no donative intent with regard to the principal when he made his
initial loan, and therefore, he should not receive a charitable deduction
for that amount.121 Under the Deduct-Include Method, the taxpayer
would take the deduction in the initial year of the loan instead of in the
year of default. The only difference between taking the deduction in the
initial year of the loan instead of later in the year of default is that taking
the deduction in the initial year gives the taxpayer the benefit of the time
value of the earlier deduction. And under the proposed change in law,
the taxpayer should receive a benefit for giving up the time value of his
money.
Let us look at an example involving default. Under current law, a
lender who lends $125 in year one takes no deduction.12 2 If the borrower
defaults in year two, the borrower is permitted a $125 deduction. What
would have been his advantage to taking the deduction in year one, in-
stead of year two? It is simply the post-tax time value of the tax he would
have saved: that is, as discussed above, $1. This is precisely the benefit we
want the lender to receive if we permit a deduction for foregone
120. See I.R.C. § 166(d) (2006).





In sum, the Deduct-Include Method is a simple and accurate way to
implement the deduction for foregone interest.
V. OBJECTIONS
Several objections might be raised to permitting the deduction of fore-
gone interest for loans to microfinance charities. However, on further
inspection, none of these objections is strong enough to overcome the
benefits of putting microfinance organizations on an equal footing with
other charities.
A. TAX DEDUCTIONS ARE NOT NEIGHBORLY
One objection to permitting deductions for foregone interest in this
context is that people may actually prefer not to take a charitable deduc-
tion related to their loans to Kiva. It may seem less noble, and thus less
attractive, to donate money if you receive some benefit from the dona-
tion. This may be particularly true in the context of microfinance, which
emphasizes people doing things for themselves instead of taking hand-
outs. Kiva is already a tax-exempt organization under Section
501(c)(3)-that is, it is already a charity-but the fact that loans through
Kiva are not tax deductible may obscure that from lenders in a positive
way.124
There are several responses to this objection. First, the charitable de-
duction would not be required; it would simply be a possibility. Perhaps
foregoing an available deduction seems more noble than selecting an or-
ganization that does not even make deductions available.
Second, people may not understand that taking the charitable deduc-
tion is like having the U.S. government pay part of the contribution. 125
Someone who might object to taking a personal benefit for the donation
might not object if the deduction were framed as a donation to Kiva from
the U.S. government. Indeed, some people choose to make loans
through Kiva exactly because they want to offset the way their tax dollars
are spent. For example, one lender writes, describing why he loans, "I am
a war tax resister and want to take money that would have gone to bombs
and give it to people who are building a future."'126 Someone else lends
because "I would like some of my income to go to helping others[,] espe-
123. There is one additional difference between the way current law handles default
and the way the Deduct-Include Method would handle default: current law provides a
short-term capital loss, whereas the Deduct-Include Method would result in an ordinary
deduction.
124. See supra Section III.A.
125. For example, if the tax rate is 35%, deducting a $100 charitable donation reduces
tax revenue by $35. Disregarding transaction costs, making a $100 charitable donation that
is deductive is thus identical to earning $100, paying $35 tax to the government and $65
(nondeductible) to the charity, and having the government transfer the $35 to the charity.




cially as my US tax dollars are often spent on causes that I do not agree
with. '127 And a third person writes that she loans because "I work for
the federal government. This is my way of guaranteeing that US tax dol-
lars (my paycheck) fund social causes!" 128 These people, at least, might
be glad to take a deduction if they understood that a tax deduction is in
many ways the equivalent of directing their tax dollars to Kiva.
Finally, a lender could use the charitable deduction to donate more to
Kiva. Someone who would have donated $100 if no charitable deduction
were available might decide to donate a few dollars more, enough to
completely offset any personal advantage he might have derived from the
charitable deduction. In other words, he could pass the advantage of the
charitable deduction to Kiva instead of keeping it for himself. Increasing
the donation to Kiva could put the lender in exactly the situation he
would have been in with no charitable deduction.
These are practical, financial arguments, however. A more intangible
argument is more difficult to answer: perhaps permitting a charitable de-
duction would harm the sense of "community" that Kiva lenders value.12 9
It might be more difficult to imagine communal bonds among lenders if
the lending experience were made more financial instead of seemingly
stemming purely from the goodness of the lenders' hearts.
But educating the lenders about the possible benefits of the charitable
deduction to Kiva and the individuals who eventually borrow from Kiva
should help alleviate that concern. If a charitable deduction is available
for lenders to Kiva, then lenders could increase the amount of their loans
so that all of the tax savings is passed on to the ultimate borrowers. In-
deed, while Kiva itself should probably avoid giving tax advice to its lend-
ers, the community could publicize the tax deduction among itself and let
people know that taking the tax deduction would allow them to loan
more money to Kiva. One can imagine, for example, a web calculator
that would permit people to enter their yearly taxable income and find
out exactly how much more they could afford to loan to Kiva if they take
advantage of the charitable deduction.
To avoid a charitable deduction in the name of community when that
deduction could increase funds ultimately transferred to the borrowers
seems to sacrifice what one hopes is the ultimate goal of Kiva lenders-
helping the borrowers who live in poverty-for the sake of the lenders'
personal benefit-an increased sense of community among themselves.
In other words, refusing the charitable deduction is more selfish than ac-
cepting it and increasing one's loan to Kiva.
127. Kiva, Kiva Lender: David, http://www.kiva.org/lender/david6844 (last visited Aug.
8, 2008).
128. Kiva, Kiva Lender: Holly, http://www.kiva.org/lender/PokrChick (last visited Aug.
8, 2008).
129. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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B. DONATIONS TO KIVA AS FOREIGN AID
Another possible objection to making foregone interest deductible is
that Kiva has an international focus. In particular, Kiva on-loans money
interest-free to its "field partners," all of whom are based outside the
United States.130 Just as individual lenders to Kiva donate the time value
of their money, so Kiva passes on this benefit in the form of interest-free
loans to the field partner microfinance lenders, who in turn do charge
interest to the individual borrowers. 131 Kiva characterizes this as "com-
pensating" these partners by "allowing them to keep the interest charged
on these funds provided by Kiva.' 32 Some might argue the United
States government should not be funding foreign aid through charitable
deductions. 133 (Recall that when an individual takes a tax deduction for a
charitable donation, the government is essentially funding a portion of
that individual's donation.)134 But this cannot be an objection to Kiva in
particular. Many U.S. charities send money overseas, and donations to
these charities can be tax deductible.' 35 Indeed, the amount spent by the
United States (in the form of tax expenditures) due to the deduction of
foreign-bound donations may be well over $1 billion.1 36 Kiva is far from
unique in this regard.
C. No BANG FOR THE (COMPLIANCE) BUCK
All this may seem like more trouble than it is worth. Let us return to
the Deduct-Include Method. 137 Assume that a lender can get a 5% re-
turn on his investment (which may be optimistic) and that he is in the
25% tax bracket. If he loans $100 (the average amount a Kiva lender
loans), the net benefit to him of this deduction will be less than $1.138 It
hardly seems worthwhile for the lender to bother investing the $25, and
130. See Kiva, Kiva's Field Partners, http://www.kiva.orglabout/partners/ (last visited
Aug. 8, 2008) (listing Kiva's field partners).
131. See Kiva, supra note 29.
132. See Application for Recognition of Exemption, I.R.S. Form 1023, Kiva Microfunds
(Oct. 2004).
133. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Hidden Foreign Aid, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 641, 649, 672-79
(2007) (describing how a "foreign aid subsidy occurs any time individuals or corporations
make contributions to a U.S.-based nonprofit that runs or supports appropriate programs
outside the country," and noting both drawbacks and advantages to this sort of foreign aid
subsidy).
134. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
135. Donations to these charities are deductible if the U.S. charity reviews and ap-
proves the grants to foreign organizations and maintains control over the donated funds
and discretion as to their use. Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101. According to Kiva, "Kiva
will retain full control and authority over which microbusinesses are selected by ... Kiva
Partners, to ensure that each microbusiness selected furthers Kiva's mission." Application
for Recognition of Exemption, supra note 132.
136. Pozen, supra note 134, at 662-63 (suggesting, based on "casual empiricism," that
the charitable deduction may result in between $1.4 billion and $2.8 billion in overseas tax
expenditures).
137. See supra Subsection IV.B.2.
138. The deduction in year one is $100, saving him $25 in tax. If he invests this money
at a 5% annual return, he will get $1.25, on which he will pay $0.31 tax, leaving him a net
benefit of $0.94. When the loan is repaid he will, of course, have to pay tax on the returned
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the lender might be happy to pay more than $1 to avoid the paperwork
that will inevitably accompany the charitable deduction. 139
It is true that the current average loan is relatively small. But this is the
size of loan made when no charitable deduction is available for the fore-
gone interest. The average size of the loans might well increase if lending
through Kiva fit with standard charitable planning. And the value of the
deduction will increase as interest rates increase. If interest rates climb
back to their 1980s levels-say, 15%-the value of a deduction will also
climb. In our example, if a lender could get a 15% return on his invest-
ment, the net benefit to him of the deduction would be almost $3.140
Judging the deduction based on its current value is thus short-sighted, as
this relatively low value is not intrinsic, but rather is contingent on cir-
cumstances-the value of the loans made and the applicable interest
rate-that may well change.
D. UNPROVEN MICROFINANCE
Someone might also make the objection that there is no proof of the
effectiveness of microfinance, particularly microfinance such as Kiva's, in
which individual lenders send small amounts of money to particular poor
people. In particular, some argue that microcredit standing alone-as op-
posed to microfinance, which includes other financial services such as in-
surance and savings programs-provides little benefit to the very poor.141
Thomas Dichter, who has worked in microfinance for many years, has
called Kiva a "totally unnecessary organization that exists to please the
people who are participating and isn't making any real difference." 142
There is no doubt that microfinance's effectiveness deserves further
study-and indeed, it is receiving further study-though there is also rea-
son to believe that microfinance is effective and powerful. 143 But, in the
meantime, the question is whether the United States should provide a
charitable deduction for donations to an organization whose effectiveness
is not proven. Again, this is a larger question, and the current U.S. ap-
proach to charities is clear: the United States does not closely investigate
the methods that charities use to implement their goals and does not re-
voke tax-exempt status simply because a particular charity's approach is
principal under the Deduct-Include Method, thus erasing the initial $25 savings and leaving
him only the benefit of the time value of that savings.
139. Presumably Kiva will send the lender a letter with respect to the year he makes the
loan, telling him he can deduct the amount of the loan, and will file some type of Form
1099 in the year the principal is repaid, telling both the lender and the IRS that this amount
needs to be included in income.
140. The deduction in year one is $100, saving him $25 in tax. If he invests this money
at a 15% annual return, he will get $3.75, on which he will pay $0.94 tax, leaving him a net
benefit of $2.81.
141. See, e.g., Hugh Allen, Finance Begins with Savings, Not Loans, in WHAT'S WRONG
WITH MICROFINANCE 49 (Thomas Dichter & Malcolm Harper eds., 2007).
142. Daniel Dale, Anyone Can Lend a Hand via Web, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 14, 2007, at
Bus.1.
143. See discussion supra Section II.A.
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not particularly effective, as long as the charity is organized and operated
for the appropriate purpose (and certain other requirements are met, in-
cluding, for example, a ban on political activity for certain tax-exempt
organizations). 144 Indeed, the United States granted tax-exempt status to
Kiva notwithstanding the arguably unproven benefit of its microcredit
program. 1 45 Whether Kiva itself is effective does not answer the question
of whether there should be a distinction, from a tax perspective, between
loans to Kiva and donations to Kiva. If Kiva and its microcredit ap-
proach turn out to be ineffective, people can stop lending or donating
money to Kiva. The United States lets the market for donations resolve
the effectiveness of a charity.
E. PLENTY OF DEMAND
Finally, it may seem that there is no need to increase the attractiveness
of loans through an organization like Kiva. After all, Kiva has been
wildly successful and indeed actually "sold out" of loans in December of
2007.146 In January 2007, individual loans were temporarily capped at $25
to permit more people to participate. 147 One main reason for the charita-
ble deduction is to increase donations, and it seems that Kiva has plenty
of people willing to lend; if Kiva is limited by anything, it is by its capacity
to find appropriate borrowers. There is, it appears, no need to increase
donations.
But the question is not whether Kiva is operating to capacity. If the
charitable donation makes lending more desirable, perhaps more organi-
zations like Kiva can form (because there will be more demand for the
organizations). Indeed, if microfinance is a preferable form of charity,
there should be more organizations like Kiva.
Additionally, Kiva is currently a popular charity, but there is some con-
cern that microfinance in general, and U.S. interest in microfinance in
particular, is not sustainable-that is, that microfinance will not generate
enough money and attention to remain viable. 148 This is not unique to
Kiva; sustainability is always a concern of nonprofits, which generally rely
on donations for support.1 49 But if loans through Kiva become finan-
cially comparable to other charitable donations, Kiva may become part of
regular financial and charitable planning instead of being merely the fla-
vor of the month.
Finally, when interest rates increase (as they doubtless will eventually),
loans to Kiva might decrease, especially if no charitable deduction is
144. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
145. I.R.S., Search for Charities, http://www.irs.gov/app/pub-78 (search "Organization"
for "Kiva Microfunds") (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
146. Walker, supra note 5.
147. Id.
148. See Allen, supra note 142, at 49-50.
149. See J.D. Von Pischke, Methodenstreit and Sustainability in Microfinance General-
izations Describing Institutional Frameworks, in WHAT'S WRONG WITH MICROFINANCE,
supra note 141, at 144.
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available for foregone interest. Interest rates currently hover in the lower
single digits, so foregoing interest is not so painful now. But if interest
rates increased substantially-thirty years ago interest rates were 15% or
more-loans to Kiva would suddenly become much more expensive. In
the absence of a charitable deduction offsetting some portion of the cost
of forgoing interest, Kiva and similar organizations might be at risk of
disappearing.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that taxpayers should receive a charitable de-
duction for the interest they forego when they loan money interest-free to
the poor in developing countries through microfinance organizations such
as Kiva. This deduction for foregone interest would be consistent with
current exceptions to the general rule barring a charitable deduction for
the donation of partial interests and would not create compliance con-
cerns that might attend donations of partial interests in general. Moreo-
ver, the practical benefits of the deduction could be significant, especially
because the deduction could be relatively simple to implement and could
mirror the lenders' actual financial cost of lending. Permitting a deduc-
tion for interest foregone on loans to Kiva and similar microcredit organi-
zations will help these organizations to thrive and thus, as the Nobel
Committee stated about another microcredit institution, to play a role as
an "important liberating force" and a "major part" of eliminating poverty
as we know it.15 °
150. Norwegian Nobel Committee, supra note 22.
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